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30 June 1960

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



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#### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

30 June 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Nepal - Communist China: The clash between Nepalese and Chinese border units on 26 June, in which Katmandu charges that one army officer was killed and 15 unarmed Nepalese captured, will make much more difficult the implementation of border demarcation procedures recently ratified by Peiping and Katmandu. Both capitals will probably try to prevent a build-up of tension, however, by referring the incident to the boundary committees now being organized. In India the effect of the clash will be to heighten anti-Chinese sentiment perhaps even more than in Nepal.

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|                | III. THE WEST  | _    |
| 25X1           | Venezuela - Dominican Republic: The Venezuelan foreign minister advised the diplomatic representatives of the American republics in Caracas on 27 June that the captured ringleaders of the 24 June assassination attempt on President Betancourt had disclosed Dominican involvement in the plot and stated that Vene-  |      |
|                | zuela was considering measures in response to this act of aggression. His confidential statement followed the release of a Venezuelan communique branding the Trujillo dictatorship a threat to hemispheric peace and morally incapacitated for membership in the OAS and the UN. The Venezuelan Government is likely to | 25X′ |
|                | have recourse to the OAS or the UN before attempting retaliatory action.   |      |
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|                | 30 June 60 DAILY BRIEF ii  |      |
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| 25X1   | IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS   |      |
|        | With respect to the question of Sino-Soviet bloc intentions to initiate hostilities, the Watch Committee Conclusions remain negative. | 25X1 |

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DAILY BRIEF

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#### Sino-Nepalese Border Clash

The clash between Nepalese and Chinese Communist border units on 26 June will make much more difficult the implementation of boundary demarcation procedures recently ratified by Katmandu and Peiping. The incident occurred in the isolated Mustang area, a salient in west-central Nepal projecting into Tibet. Prime Minister Koirala charged that a Nepalese checkpost officer had been killed and 15 Nepalese nationals "arrested." The boundary line between semi-autonomous Mustang and Tibet traditionally has been vague. Nepalese authorities on 29 June officially protested the "unprovoked" attack as a violation of the agreement reached in March demilitarizing the Sino-Nepalese border.

The Nepalese Government has attempted to maintain a detached position toward the Sino-Indian border dispute and to minimize Nepal's "minor" disagreements on boundary demarcation with China. To avoid involvement in incidents such as those which occurred in Assam and Ladakh, Koirala earlier this year sought a border agreement with Peiping recognizing the "traditional" boundary.

Nepal now has been placed, like India, in the position of an injured party in the dispute, and growing political pressures presumably will limit the government's ability to negotiate a final settlement with Peiping.

Peiping will probably not accept responsibility for the clash, but both governments are likely to try to ease current tension by referring the problem to the boundary commission now being set up.

The incident will heighten anti-Chinese sentiment in India perhaps even more than in Nepal. Indian proponents of a more forceful border policy toward the Chinese are likely to step up their pressure on Nehru's government, particularly in light of the Indian prime minister's previous statements that any attack on Nepal would be regarded as an attack on India.

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#### Venezuela Considering Action Against the Dominican Republic

The Venezuelan foreign minister advised the diplomatic representatives of the American republics in Caracas on 27 June that the captured ringleaders of the 24 June assassination attempt on President Betancourt had disclosed Dominican involvement in the plot and that Venezuela was considering measures in response to this act of aggression. His confidential statement followed the release of a Venezuelan communique calling the Trujillo dictatorship a threat to hemispheric peace and morally incapacitated for membership in the OAS and the UN.

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Venezuelan security forces have obtained evidence that the would-be assassins were trained and provided with explosive equipment in the Dominican Republic and flown to Venezuela illegally in a commercial airliner. The key leader is a Venezuelan naval captain exiled earlier this year for plotting against the government.

Betancourt was under pressure from his own military to act against Trujillo after the Dominican-supported uprising in Venezuela on 20-21 April, and such action would probably now be popular among almost all classes in Venezuela. The unprecedented condemnation this month by the OAS' Inter-American Peace Committee of the Trujillo regime for flagrant violation of human rights—charges initiated by Venezuela—may encourage Venezuela to have further recourse to OAS channels—and perhaps the United Nations—in an effort to eliminate the Trujillo dictatorship.

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The Secretary of State

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The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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